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MARK R. JOELSON*
JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN* *

The Legal Status of Nation-State
Cartels Under United States Antitrust
and Public International Lawt
I.

Introduction

There has been much public discussion recently concerning the legal status of
nation state "cartels" under United States antitrust and public international
law. The theoretical scope that an article on the possible antitrust exposure of
nation state cartels might cover is vast and would entail many complex, as well
as judicially unresolved, legal issues. Consequently, we decided that the most
practicable and pertinent method of examining the topic would be in the
context of two specific factual situations, i.e., the Arab oil embargo of October
1973 and the price increases imposed by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) since October 1973.
II.

Background of Arab Actions

OPEC was created on September 14, 1960 as a permanent intergovernmental
organization by five states.' The organization's constitution is contained in two
resolutions adopted by delegates from the five founder states and later ratified
by the governments of each of those states.2 OPEC was not given any sovereign
powers by its member states. It adopts "resolutions" which are submitted to
member state governments for approval. If such resolutions are approved they
are implemented by the member states.3

* B.A., Harvard College; J.D., Harvard Law School; Diploma in Law, Oxford University
(Fulbright Scholar); Member, District of Columbia Bar.
• * B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Diploma in Law,
Oxford University; Member, District of Columbia Bar.
tThis article is based on an information report which was prepared at the request of Wilbur L.
Fugate, Chairman of the Committee on International Aspects of Antitrust Law. It does not reflect
action taken by any committee and should not be regarded as representing the official position of
the American Bar Association, or of its Section of International Law. The authors acknowledge the
helpful suggestions and gracious cooperation afforded by Mr. Fugate. The report has been adopted
as the Report of the Committee on International Aspects of Antitrust Law.
'Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
IF. ROUHANI, A HISTORY OF O.P.E.C. 77 (1971). [hereinafter cited as Rouhani].
Id. at 169-70.
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According to its former Secretary-General, OPEC was created "as a means of
self-defense"' against unilateral price decisions made collectively by privately
owned multinational oil companies operating in its member states. The crux of
the price dispute was the setting of the "posted price" of crude oil. This "posted
price" is an accounting fiction used for different categories of crude oil such as
"Arabian Light crude" upon which the producing governments impose their
taxes and royalties. These taxes and royalties are only one component of the
market price of oil which also includes costs of production, transportation,
storage and distribution, oil company profits and taxes levied by consumer
countries.
In 1948, the posted price of oil had been set at $2.17 per barrel by the oil
companies. This price was gradually and unilaterally reduced by the oil
companies to $1.80 by August 1960. The oil companies contended that these
reductions were necessary because of a glut in world oil supply and a need to
remain competitive in European and Japanese markets. On the other hand, the
oil producing countries saw the reductions in the posted price as a threat to their
own development because taxes and royalties imposed on the posted price were
their principal source of income. Consequently OPEC was organized as a
countervailing force to the collective power of the oil companies. Its goal was to
stabilize and then restore the posted price to its previous higher levels.' The
second Resolution adopted by the original founder states of OPEC also noted
that "The principal aim of the Organization shall be unification of petroleum
-6
policies for the member countries ....
Between 1960 and 1973 OPEC increased to 12 member states7 and gradually
increased its bargaining power vis-a-vis the oil companies. 8 In 1972, the
principle of "participation" (ownership) by producer states in the established oil
producing concession companies was accepted by the oil companies. The
"participation" was to begin with an immediate 25 percent ownership and rise
to 51 percent by 1983. 9

'Statement of Abderrahman Khene, Secretary-General of OPEC, in Summary of the Hearings
Before the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on
Development and on Interiational Relations 255 (1974).

'See M.

MUGHRABY, PERMANENT SOVERIGNTY OVER OIL RESOURCES

131 (1966). Amuzegar,

OPECin the Context of the Global PowerEquation, 4 DENVERJ. INTL L. & POL. 221-222 (1974);
Amuzegar, The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play, 51 FoR. AFF. 676 (1973).
'ROUHANI,

supra note 2, at 78.

'In addition to the original 5 states the members are Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria,
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
'For a discussion of this time period see, Alnasrawi, Collective BargainingPower in OPEC, 7J.
J. WORLD TRADE L. 188 (1973).
'General Agreement on Participation. See, Report on Multinational Oil Corporation and U.S.
Foreign Policy by the Subcom. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 135-36 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as Church Subcomm.
Rep.].
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OPEC was seen by its member states as an organization with economic goals.
After the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 several Arab states felt that another
organization should be created that would utilize oil resources as a political
weapon to achieve the Arabs' goals vis-a-vis Israel. Consequently, in 1968 the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was established
by several Arab states.1"
IE[.

Arab Conduct

A.

Embargo and Production Cutbacks of October 1973
On October 6, 1973 several Arab states launched an armed attack on Israel.
Three days later Kuwait called for an emergency meeting of Arab oil ministers
to discuss "the role of oil in the light of current developments."' I On October
15th the United States Department of State announced that the United States
had begun to resupply Israel with military equipment. The following day, the
ministers of the six OPEC Persian Gulf member states met in Kuwait and
decided to raise unilaterally the posted price of Arabian crude oil by
approximately 70 percent. 12 On October 17th, the ministers of the OAPEC
countries met and issued a communique' and a resolution announcing an
immediate 5 percent oil production cutback in each member state, with similar
reductions to be applied each successive month "until such a time as the
international community compels Israel to relinquish our occupied territories... ."I' The ministers also recommended that Arab states embargo oil
shipments to the United States. These tactics of escalating production cutbacks
and discrimination in the shipment of oil to "friendly" as compared to
"unfriendly" states were, according to the Arabs, intended to achieve the goal of
"liberation of the Arab territories occupied in the June 1967 war and the
' 14
recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."
During the next few days Saudi Arabia and six other Arab states imposed an
embargo on shipments of oil to the United States and other countries and
reduced oil production by various amounts.

['lHE
ENERGY CRISIS AND U.S. FoREIoN POLICY 91-92 (J. Szyliowicz & B. O'Neill eds. 1975);

note 2, at 163-64.
"Shihata, DestinationEmbargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under InternationalLaw, 68 AM. J.

ROUHANI, supra
INT'L

L. 591, 592 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Shihatal.

1216 MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY [MEES], No. 52, Oct. 19, 1973,
Rep. supra note 9 at 144; PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Oct. 22,
-

at i; Church Subcomm.
1973, at 1. The Persian

Gulf states are Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
li16 MEES, No. 52, Oct. 19, 1973, at iii-iv. The resolution is quoted in full in Shihata, supra note
11, at 593.
"4Id.
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By early November 1973 the destination embargoes, production cutbacks and
first posted price increase were firmly in place. After several months of
continuously changing embargoes and cutback percentages the embargo on
shipments of Arab oil to the United States was lifted in March 1974. However,
the, Arab states continued to discriminate among "friendly," "neutral" and
"embargoed" states.1 5
According to testimony and documents given to the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations the
Arab states ordered the privately owned multinational oil companies to
administer the embargo and production cutbacks. For example, it was reported
that Saudi Arabia's Oil Minister, Sheikh Yamani, informed the representatives
of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) how Saudi Arabia wanted its
embargo and -production cutbacks implemented and warned "that noncompliance would mean nationalization 'at gunpoint'."' 6 The acquiescence of
Aramco and other oil companies to orders to administer the embargo and
production cutbacks led Senator Church to state that American oil companies
"have in fact become the policing agents of the Arabs' boycott against the
United States. Perhaps, as they say, they have no choice and must follow the
dictates of the producing countries within which they have located their oil
operations."' 7
B. Increases in PostedPrices
The previously mentioned 70 percent increase in the posted price of oil (from
$3.01 to $5.12 per barrel) imposed on October 16, 1973 by the six Persian Gulf
member states of OPEC was the culmination of a long-standing dispute over
price calculations between the oil companies and the members of OPEC.
The OPEC countries believed that the posted price set unilaterally by the oil
companies was artificially low and bore no relation to the actual sales price of
oil. They argued that the long-standing concession agreements between the
producing countries and the oil companies, permitting the oil companies to set
prices unilaterally, were essentially contracts of adhesion forced upon the
producing countries by the oil companies acting collectively. Because the OPEC
countries rely heavily on oil taxes and royalties for foreign exchange receipts,
fiscal revenues and development they became convinced that they must obtain
greater control over exploitation of this depletable natural resource.

"See, 17 MEES, No. 22, March 22, 1974, at 1,6 (Communique of March 18, 1974); Tanner, Oil
Shipments to U.S. Renewed by Saudi Arabia, Wall St. J.,March 26, 1974, at 2, col. 2; Church
Subcomm. Rep., supra note 9, at 144-45; Shihata, supra note 11, at 595-98.
"Church Subcomm. Rep., supra note 9, at 146. See generally, Hearings on Multinational
Petroleum Companies and ForeignPolicy Before the Subcomm. on MultinationalCorporationsof
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7 (1974).
"7Press Release, Senator Frank Church, Dec. 7, 1973, at 1.
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Consequently as it became stronger OPEC began to demand a renegotiation of
the original concession agreements and an increase in the government take
(taxes and royalties) per barrel of oil.
In February 1970 a major new agreement was reached between the Gulf
countries and oil companies that provided for an average 30 cents per barrel
immediate increase in thegovernment take which was to remain constant for
five years. This "Teheran Agreement"' I quickly broke down and on September
16, 1973 the OPEC states requested the oil companies to attend a special
conference in Vienna on October 8 to discuss substantial increases in the
government take. The joint oil industry negotiating team proposed a 15 percent
increase in the posted price on October 9. Sheikh Yamani announced that the
OPEC members were prepared to accept a 100 percent increase in the posted
price. On October 16,1973 the six Persian Gulf OPEC members met in Kuwait
and announced a unilateral immediate 70 percent increase in the posted price of
oil exported from their states and recommended that other OPEC countries
adopt the same increase. The communique announcing this increase gave no
reason for the decision.19 However, at a later date, the Chief of the Iranian
Economic Mission in Washington stated that "after weeks of unsuccessful
negotiations with the companies, the oil-exporting governments declared their
intention to establish oil prices among themselves, free from the obstructionist
20
tactics of the companies in bilateral bargaining.''
In November 1973 the OPEC countries announced that they believed "that
the pricing of petroleum, like the pricing of other internationally-traded
manufactured goods, commodities and raw-materials, should be marketoriented. '1 This announcement signaled a rejection of the Teheran Agreement
approach to determining posted prices, i.e., long term price commitments
regardless of changing market prices. OPEC had chosen to link the tax
reference posted price to the actual market price of oil. Under the new OPEC
formula posted prices and future adjustments thereto would be maintained at a
22
constant ratio to market prices.
In.December 1973 the OPEC nations announced a new 130 percent increase
in the posted price of oil.2 3 Thus between October 1 and December 31, 1973 the
posted price of oil rose from $3.01 per barrel to $11.65 per barrel and the
market price of oil reached $22 per barrel. Throughout 1974 the posted price of

"Agreement of Feb. 14, 1971; 10 INTL LEGAL MATS. 247-54 (1971).
"Communique of Oct. 16, 1973, reprinted in PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Oct. 22,1973,
at 9.
2
"Amuzegar, OPECin the Context of the Global PowerEquation,4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & CoMM.
221, 222 (1974).
21
Press Release of Nov. 20, 1973, reprinted in OPEC ANNUAL REV. AND REC. 1973, at 45-46.
22
MEES, No. 5, Nov. 23, 1973, at 4, 6.
"3Communiqui of Dec. 23, 1973, PETROLEUM INTELLIGEN'CE WEEKLY, Dec. 31, 1973, at 10.
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oil remained constant but the oil producing countries increased their tax and
royalty rates imposed on the posted price by nearly 50 percent thereby causing
further increases in the market price of oil.24
The questions to be considered in this article are the legality under United
States antitrust law and public international law of the Arab oil embargo and
production cutbacks and the OPEC price increases.
IV.

U.S. Antitrust Law

There is little doubt that the concerted actions taken by the Arabs and by
OPEC to boycott certain countries, to restrict their oil production in order to
create an artificial scarcity and to agree on prices would be subject to the
legislative jurisdiction of United States courts under the Sherman Act if they
had been engaged in by private enterprises rather than by governments.
Under the well-known Alcoa2" rule the Sherman Act has been held to apply to
conduct outside the United States which was intended to and did have an effect
on United States interstate or foreign commerce. The Arabs' conduct clearly
was intended to and did affect the import of oil into the United States.
Moreover, that conduct also affected United States domestic oil prices and its
interstate commerce. In addition, under other well-established precedents a
United States court could assert adjudicatory jurisdiction either in rem or in
personam over such foreign enterprises as had the requisite minimum contacts
with the United States. 6
However, because the concerted action under study was engaged in by
national governments, which directed anticompetitive conduct by private
companies implementing the governmental decisions, the question arises
whether a United States court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction
because the conduct complained of was that of foreign sovereigns.
A.

Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been recognized in the United States
at least since 1812.27 It cloaks a foreign sovereign with immunity from suit,
without his consent, in United States courts. Sovereign immunity is not an
absolute bar to jurisdiction, but rather an affirmative defense based upon

24

Church Subcomm. Rep., supra note 9, at 150. Kraar, OPEC Is Starting to Feel the Pressure,

FORTUNE, May 1975, at 186, 190.

"U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). See, Holmes, Shortages:
TraditionalAntitrust Analysis in a New Setting, 36 U. PIrr. L. REV. 647, 648-50 (1975).
"6See U.S. v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 360-64 (1975); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
87-110 (2d ed. 1973).
2
'he Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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theories of sovereign independence, the equality of nation states, comity and
fairness. It arises only in those cases in which a foreign state or its
instrumentality is sought to be made a party to litigation and is based upon
international comity rather than upon the Constitution or specific statutes."
Early judicial decisions held that the immunity of a foreign sovereign was
absolute . 29However, this absolute immunity began to erode and courts began to
distinguish public or governmental acts (ure imperi) from private or
commercial acts (juregestionis). Immunity was permitted for the former but not
the latter." However, this distinction was never precisely delineated and courts
in the United States have reached decisions that do not necessarily fall into a
consistent pattern. For example, a foreign state's contractual purchases of army
equipment in the United States" and the operation of a railroad by a foreign
state" have been held to be governmental actions. On the other hand, a state
hiring an advertising agency to promote tourism33 and the operation of a coal
purchasing business through a corporation34 have been held to be commercial
activities.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was raised in only two litigated antitrust
cases before 1952. In United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft 11 a
motion to set aside service of process on a French corporation was denied. The
stock of the corporation was owned eleven-fifteenths by the French Government
and the corporation was organized by the French Government to administer
potash mines in Alsace-Lorraine. The court held that the complaint was against
actions of the corporation which under French law was a separate entity from its
shareholders including the French Government. Moreover, the corporation was
not immune from suit under French law and its bylaws provided that it could be
used.3 6 Consequently, the claim that the corporation was an instrumentality of
the French Government was rejected.

2
National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356,359 (1955). Petrol Shipping
Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
29
See generally, E. ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 3-14
(1933); J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 244 (6th ed. 1963); Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before
United States Courts, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 455 (1970); Comment, Restrictive Sovereign Immunity,
The State Department and the Courts, 62 Nw. 1. L. REV. 397 (1967).
3
See, Comment, Sovereign Immunity for Commercial Instrumentalitiesof Foreign Governments,
58 YALE L. J. 176 (1948).
31
Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 F. 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663
(1918).
32
Oliver American Trading Co. v. Gov't of the United States of Mexico, 5 F.2d 659, 665 (2d Cir.
1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596 (1925).
33
Harris & Co. Advertising Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. App. 1961).
34
Coale v. Societ6 Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
1131 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
3031 F.2d at 202.
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In the Oil Cartel7 grand jury investigation the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., a British Company, moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum
served upon it at its New York office on the ground that it was an
instrumentality of the British Government and therefore, immune from suit.
The British Government owned a majority of the voting shares of the company
and contributed approximately 35 percent of the company's total capital. The
Court found that the ownership of the majority of the voting stock gave the
British Government "control" of the company and added:
However, of far more potency is the object and purpose of the corporation. [The British
Government] acquired its interest in this company to insure a proper supply of petroleum, crude oil and other products for the British fleet.
The supplying of oil to insure the maintenance and operation of a naval force-and in
this day and age, an air force-is certainly a fundamental government function serving a,
public purpose.38
The Court concluded that Anglo-Iranian was entitled to sovereign immunity
' 39
because it was "indistinguishable from the Government of Great Britain. "
Deutsches Kalisyndikat was distinguished because in that case the French
Government "was involved in a commercial venture, entirely divorced from any
governmental function." 4
In 1952 the U.S. Department of State announced in the famous "Tate Letter"
that it would henceforth follow the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity,
which distinguishes governmental and commercial activity, in determining
whether to make suggestions of immunity to courts because "the widespread
and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial
activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business
with them to have their rights determined in the courts."" 1 The "Tate Letter"
offered no guidelines for determining whether a sovereign's act is governmental
or commercial, and the State Department often did not explain the basis of its
determination of whether it should make a suggestion of immunity.
The only reported antitrust case to arise after the "Tate Letter" was the

GrandJuryInvestigation of the Shipping Industry.42 In that case the Philippine
Government sought to quash a subpoena duces tecum served on the Philippine
National Lines on the ground that the company was an instrumentality of the
Philippine Government which had nationalized the shipping line. The
Department of State refused to suggest immunity because "it appears to the
Department that the Philippine National Lines is engaged in commercial

"In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 288 (P.D.L. 1952).
38
1d. at 290.
39
Id. at 291.
0
41d.
4'Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952, in 26 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 984, 985 (1952).
42186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
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activities.... ."", The Court stated that the case "seems to fall somewhere in
between the [Oil Cartel] and the [Deutsches Kalisyndikat]cases,"" and reserved
a decision on the issuance of the subpoena because "at this juncture in the
proceedings, the Court is unable to ascertain whether the grand jury will use the
information it seeks to possibly attempt to indict the Philippine National Lines
or use the information to indict others.""5 The decision was reserved pending a
showing by the Government that (1) Philippine National Lines' activities were
substantially, if not entirely, commercial; (2) the documents were needed for the
furtherance of the investigation to prosecute others; and/or (3) evidence existed
of its joining with others to violate federal laws.
In subsequent cases not involving antitrust issues the practice developed that
if the Department of State filed a suggestion of immunity, that determination
was accepted without inquiry by the courts. Similarly, if the State Department
indicated either directly of indirectly that immunity need not be accorded, most
courts considered themselves bound by that determination. If the State
Department was not requested to suggest immunity the issue of immunity could
be raised as a defense by the foreign government and the court would determine
whether the act giving rise to the suit was "governmental" or "commercial" in
accordance with the Tate Letter." 6
At least three alternative tests were developed by courts and commentators
for differentiating governmental and commercial acts. The "nature of the
transaction" test categorized as sovereign acts only those acts which could not
be performed by individuals. The "purpose of the transaction" test provided
that only activities performed for a public purpose were immune. The third test,
adopted by the Second Circuit in the Victory Transport47 case, involved listing a
series of strictly political or public acts which were the only acts to be granted
immunity. The Victory Transport list contained five types of acts entitled to
immunity.
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization

"Id. at 318.
"Id. at 319.
451d.
"See, e.g., Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 382 (D.D.C. 1974) (State
Department's refusal to suggest immunity is binding on court); Ocean Transport Co. v. Republic of
the Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 705 (E.D. La. 1967) (State Department's refusal to suggest
immunity is not binding); Heaney v. Gov't of Spain, 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971) (no request for
suggestion of immunity). See, generally, Goodman, Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns: A Politicalor
Legal Question-Victory Transport Revisited, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 855 (1972); Lowenfeld,
Claims Against ForeignStates-A Proposalfor Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
901 (1967); Comment, International Law-Sovereign Immunity-The First Decade of the Tate
Letter Policy, 60 Micl. L. REV. 1142 (1962).
"Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 934 (1965).
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(3) acts concerning the armed forces
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity
(5) public loans 8
In January 1973 the Department of State and the Department of Justice
submitted draft legislation intended to codify the restrictive theory and to revise
procedures relating to sovereign immunity. Bills were introduced in both Houses
of Congress 49 and hearings were held in the House of Representatives. 50 On
March 19, 1973 the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice
Department's Civil Division informed the counsel for various agencies that even
prior to the enactment of this legislation the Department of Justice would, from
the date of the letter, "be guided by the principles set forth in S. 566 in
determining whether to raise immunity as a defense to the action [in foreign
tribunals]." 5 1 The proposed legislation died at the conclusion of the 93rd
Congress.52
The proposed legislation would have established a general presumption of
immunity for foreign states and listed five exceptions to this general rule. The
most pertinent of these exceptions denied immunity in cases in which there was
"an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act has a direct effect
within the territory of the United States." 3
The proposed legislation adopted the "nature of the transaction" test to
determine whether an act is governmental or commercial. "Commercial
activity" was defined in the draft legislation to mean:
... either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose.54
Thus, the State and Justice Departments expressly rejected the alternative
"purpose of the transaction" test. During the hearings on the bill the Acting

"Id. at 360.

'IS.566,93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H. R.3493, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 119 CONG.

REC. S.

1297-1305 (Daily ed. Jan. 26, 1973).
"Hearings on Immunities of Foreign States Before the Subomm. on Claims and
GovernmentalRelations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
5

Dept. of Justice File No. 118982, reprinted in, A. ROVINE,
LAW 1973, 223-24 (1974).

DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE

IN INTERNATIONAL

2
For discussions of the proposed legislation see, Comment, The Impact of S. 566 on the Law of
Sovereign Immunity, 6 LAW& POL. INT'L Bus. 179 (1974); Note, ProposedDraftLegislation on the
Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Governments: An Attempt to Revest the Courts With a Judicial
Function, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 302 (1974); Note, Sovereign Immunity, 15 HARV. INT'L L. J. 157 (1974);
Legislative Note, JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 23 DE PAtm L. REV. 1225 (1974).

"S. 566, § 1605(2).
54S. 566, § 1603(b).
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Legal Adviser of the State Department testified that "the courts will have a good
deal of latitude in determining what is a 'commercial activity'. It does seem
unwise to attempt a precise definition in this Act, even if that were
practicable.""5 This statement implies that the draftsmen also rejected the
"specific list" test suggested by the Second Circuit in Victory Transport and
employed in The European Convention on State Immunities. 6
Having reviewed the development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the
United States and the relevant antitrust cases we now turn to the questions of
whether the Arab states could successfully claim sovereign immunity as a
defense to a suit against them alleging that their boycott, production cutbacks
and price increases violated United States antitrust laws.
1. THE EMBARGO AND PRODUCTION CUTBACKS
Whether the destination oil embargo and unilaterally imposed oil production
cutbacks are entitled to immunity depends on whether they are classified as
"commercial" or "governmental" actions. The difficulty in classifying these
actions results from the three alternative tests that can be employed to
determine whether conduct is "commercial" and from the lack of relevant
precedents. The vast majority of sovereign immunity decisions by courts in the
United States and of cases considered by the State Department have arisen in
the context of commercial or tortious interaction between foreign governments
and private citizens" as distinguished from the context of actions taken by a
number of governments collectively which affect the population of the United
States. Consequently, the situations in cases such as Victory Transport, can be
distinguished from the Arabs' embargo and production cutbacks.
Victory Transportarose out of a dispute involving damage to a cargo ship. A
branch of the Spanish Ministry of Commerce voyage-chartered the S.S. Hudson
to transport a cargo of wheat from Alabama to Spain. The ship was damaged
and delayed in Spanish ports that were allegedly unsafe for a ship of the
Hudson's size. The Spanish Government refused to pay for the damages or to
submit the dispute to arbitration as provided in the charter agreement. The
owner of the Hudson sued to compel arbitration pursuant to the charter
agreement. The Spanish Government moved to dismiss the petition to compel
arbitration on the ground that the voyage-charterer was a branch of the Spanish
Government and therefore immune from suit. In affirming the district court's
denial of the motion to dismiss the Second Circuit relied on several factors the

"Hearings, supra note 50, at 16.
"Arts. 1-14; 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 470-89 (1972). See, Mann, New Developments in the Law of
Sovereign Immunity, '36 MOD. L. REv. 18 (1973).
"See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-726 (1968).
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most significant of which was the inclusion of the arbitration clause in the
charter agreement which, the court believed, evidenced an intention to make the
agreement subject to private law.5 8 Other factors included decisions by courts in
other countries holding that purchasing activity by a state instrumentality,
particularly for resale to nationals, is commercial activity, as well as the refusal
of the State Department to suggest immunity in a case of damage to a ship
involved in the wartime transportation of rice to civilian and military personnel
in Korea. 9
By contrast, the Arabs' embargo and production cutbacks have not involved
the type of commercial interaction between states and private parties that was
present in Victory Transportand similar cases. The Arabs' conduct was general
in nature and did not involve an agreement with and/or injury to a specific
private party whose only opportunity for redress or compensation is by means of
a law suit.
Under the "nature of the transaction" test of whether activity is
"commercial," which has been accepted by the State and Justice Departments,
the embargo and production cutbacks are more likely to be classified as
"governmental." The agreement of several states to refuse to permit the
shipment of oil to certain nations more closely resembles an embargo, an action
only a state can take, than a boycott. Similarly, private persons could not order
production cutbacks by oil producers holding concessions from state
governments.
On the other hand, under the alternative "purpose of the transaction" test of
immunity this activity would clearly be classified as governmental rather than
commercial because it was intended to achieve the Arabs' political goals
vis-i-vis Israel and the management of their oil resources (inter alia,
preservation of these resources from rapid depletion) rather than to achieve a
commercial objective.
If the Victory Transport "list" test of immunity is utilized, the activity in
question might well be covered under "legislative acts" or "acts concerning
diplomatic activity."
Regardless of which test of immunity is employed it is significant to note that
the Arabs acted within, rather than outside, their own territories and were
acting directly as sovereign governments rather than through separate
commercial entities such as state trading companies. Both of these factors,
although not decisive, have often entered into considerations of whether to grant
immunity. If a sovereign engages in business activity in the territory of another

11336 F.2d at 361.
"New York & Cdba Mail Steamship Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F.Supp. 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
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state or through a separate entity, courts have sometimes considered that he has
knowingly made himself more amenable to assertions of jurisdiction by other
states and has thus given some indication of a waiver of immunity.
It is also important to remember that several distinguished commentators
have pointed out that the United States might have considerable difficulty
justifying a denial of immunity to the Arab states for alleged violations of U.S.
antitrust law based upon the embargo and production cutbacks because "the
United States itself has been one of the worst offenders in using trade controls in
ways which have adversely affected other countries." 60 These commentators
point to the Trading With the Enemy Act," the U.S. embargoes on trade with
China62 and later with Cuba,63 and export licensing requirements 64 as examples
6
of economic actions taken by the United States to achieve political goals.
In summary, we conclude that although the issue has not been judicially
resolved, it is probable that the conduct of the Arab states in imposing a
destination embargo and production cutbacks would be found to have been
"governmental" rather than "commercial" and would therefore be entitled to
immunity from a suit brought against the Arab states under the U.S. antitrust
laws.
2. INCREASES IN POSTED PRICES
The question of whether the price actions of the OPEC members are entitled
to sovereign immunity is more difficult to answer. The difficulty is caused by the
absence of conclusive evidence as to the intentions and motivations of the OPEC
members in raising the posted price. The principal communiques announcing
the increases are silent as to the reasons supporting the price decisions.
Moreover, confusing and sometimes contradictory statements have been made
by the governments involved. The Saudis seemed primarily motivated by
political concerns and yet the governments of Iran, Libya and Algeria made no

"0Statement of Prof. Richard N. Gardner, in Hearings on Economic Impact of Petroleum
Shortages Before the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomics of the JointEconomic Comm., 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1973).
650 U.S.C. App. §§1 et seq. (1970). See Craig,Application of the Trading With the Enemy Act to
Foreign CorporationsOwned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 579 (1970); Corcoran, The Trading With the Enemy Act: The Impact of the Amended Foreign
Assets Control Regulations on Canadian CorporationsOwned by Americans, 16 McGILL L.J. 460
(1970).
61Lee & McCobb, United States Trade Embargo on China, 1949-1970: Legal Status and Future
Prospects, 4 N.Y.UJ. INT'L LAW & POL. 1 (1971).
"Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962); 31 C.F.R. §§515.101 et seq. (1975).
"See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. App. §§2402-03 (1970); 15 C.F.R. §§370.1(a) et seq. (1970); see also, Muir,
The Boycott in InternationalLaw, 9 J. INT'L L. & Eco. 187, 192-95 (1974).
"See, e.g., Ball, Your Evil Embargo; Our Purity of Purpose, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1974, at 41,
Cols. 5-6; Remarks of Luke Finlay, in Panel Discussion: Foreign Governmental Control of
MultinationalCorporationsMarketing in the United States, 2 SYRACUSE J. INT'L LAW & COMM.
192, 194-95 (1975).
International Lawyer, Vol. 9, No. 4

630

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

secret of the fact that they wanted to impose the highest price possible in order
to make up for what they viewed as past economic exploitation by the developed,
consuming countries and the oil companies. 66
If the unilateral price increases imposed by the OPEC Gulf states can
properly be characterized as solely part of the Arabs' overall plan to use the "oil
weapon" to achieve their political goals vis-k-vis Israel it would be reasonable to
analyze the increases as the embargo was analyzed above and to conclude that
the price conduct was probably "governmental" under each of the three tests of
immunity.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the price increases were simply
actions to enrich the Arab states and that the first increase was imposed when
market circumstances were most favorable to the success of such a bold
maneuver which happened to coincide with the imposition of the embargo and
production cutbacks. This argument is strengthened by the announced
intention of OPEC members before the outbreak of the 1973 war to negotiate
higher posted prices.
If this argument is accepted it would seem reasonable to conclude that the
price conduct was "commercial" and therefore not entitled to immunity. Under
the "nature of the transaction" test this type of concerted activity by producers
to fix prices has been engaged in by private parties6 7 and thus is not an activity
in which only a government can engage. However, as mentioned earlier, it may
be significant that the activity in question took place within the territory of the
Arab states and was engaged in by governments rather than by separate legal
entities.
Under the "purpose of the transaction" test the price conduct was, under this
argument, commercial in purpose because it was intended to increase revenues
by means of collective power. Consequently, the conduct would not be immune.
In addition, under the "list" test it is doubtful that the price conduct would be
covered by one of the enumerated categories entitled to immunity.
We believe, in all fairness, that the evidence publicly available does not clearly
demonstrate that the price increases were either purely political or purely
commercial in nature. Rather it appears that political and financial considerations both played a significant part in determining the actions of the
OPEC members. There are no relevant United States cases which can be cited
as determinative of this situation; and support for both the grant and denial of
immunity may be gleaned from various court decisions.

"See Kraar, supra note 24, at 189-90.
"See, e.g., U.S. v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951); U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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Consequently, we cannot agree with the conclusion reached by some
commentators that Nation State cartels fall within the ambit of the United
States antitrust laws under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 8 Our
disagreement centers on the implication that this conclusion is unavoidable and
is based upon controlling, well established precedents. In the preceding sections
of our article we have attempted to demonstrate that state of United States law
on the sovereign immunity issue under consideration. At best, the cases offer
little in the way of concrete guidance or standards; and, at worst, are clearly
inconsistent.6 9 In our opinion the answer to whether the Arabs' conduct is
entitled to immunity is far from obvious and would have to be based upon
extrapolation from existing precedents.
We believe that a careful examination of the factual circumstances
surrounding the complained of conduct is essential to achieving the correct
result. Given the evidently intertwined motivations of the Arab countries'
conduct-to bring pressure to bear on Israel, to preserve and enhance the value
of their natural resources, and to reap a profit-there is no clear factual
predicate or legal precedent for labeling their actions as "commercial" in
nature.7
B.

The Act of State Doctrine

Even assuming arguendo that a United States court would not accept an
affirmative defense of sovereign immunity made by the Arab states, the question
arises whether the court could decide on the merits such a suit under the
antitrust laws challenging the embargo, production cutbacks and price
increases. If the acts giving rise to the complaint are "Acts of State" under the
Act of State doctrine they may not be subjected to scrutiny by United States
courts.

The Act of State doctrine is not a rule of international law but an exception
to ordinary rules of conflict of laws. Under traditional conflict of laws principles
the forum court first determines which law governs the issues in the case
pursuant to choice of law principles. If foreign law rather than the law of the
forum is chosen the forum court may still refuse to apply that law if it is
determined to be contrary to the public policy of the forum or to be invalid
under the applicable foreign law. The Act of State doctrine excepts from these

"See, e.g., Adams, Bringing OPEC to the Bar, Wall Street J., May 20, 1975, at 22, col. 4.
"See, e.g., Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra, note 31 (state entitled to
immunity in suit on contract for purchase of boots for its army); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of
Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (purchase of fire arms, ammunition, and other military
equipment entitled to immunity); Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d
299, 204 N.Y.S.D. 2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960), affd, 17 A.D. 2d 927, 233 N.Y.S. 2d 1013 (1962)
(purchase of meat supply for army held not to be a public act).
"Warnke, Commodity Cartels-Their Implications for International and Domestic Law, p. 6
(Speech before Southwestern Legal Foundation, June 14, 1975).
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traditional principles acts of a foreign sovereign within its own territory. Thus if
the outcome of the issues in the case turns upon the act of a foreigh sovereign
within its own territory the United States court will refuse to inquire into the
legality of that act under the applicable law and will recognize the validity of the
act regardless of the public policy of the forum.71 The doctrine was first clearly
enunciated in -the United States in the 1897 case of Underhill v. Hernandez,
where Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for a unanimous court said. "the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory.""
The Act of State doctrine was first applied in an antitrust context in the
American Banana" case which involved a complaint for treble damages by the
American Banana Company to the effect that the United Fruit Company had
monopolized and restrained the importation of bananas from Central America
into the United States. American Banana alleged that the Costa Rican militia
had driven its employees off its plantations in Panamanian territory occupied by
Costa Rica, had seized the plantation and a cargo of plantation supplies, and
had stopped construction of a railway being built by the plaintiff. All of these
actions were allegedly instigated by the defendant company.
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the complaint did not state a cause of
action because: (1) the acts causing the damage were done outside the United
States and were, therefore, not within the purview of the Sherman Act; and (2)
the seizures of the plantation and railway by Costa Rican soldiers were acts of a
foreign sovereign the validity of which could not be challenged under the rule of
Underhill v. Hernandez.
Since American Banana the Act of State doctrine has been applied primarily
in cases involving expropriations 74 and a few antitrust cases involving restrictive
practices that were carried on by private parties but were permitted or required
by foreign law. 7"
Two fairly recent United States District Court opinions contain the latest
judicial pronouncements concerning the Act of State doctrine vis-A-vis the

"See 6 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-54 (1968); First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
428, 431-34, 436-37 (1964); Henkin, Act of State Today; Recollection in Tranquility, 6 COL M. J.

L. 175 (1967). The Supreme Court has announced that it may reconsider the present
scope of the Act of State doctrine. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 43 U.S.L.W.
3659 (U.S. 1975) (No. 73-1288).
TRANSNAT'L

'1168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
"American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
"See generally, Kramer, Modem Status of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 ALR FED. 707 (1972).
"See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07
(1962); U.S. v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); U.S. v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info.
Center, Inc. 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600, at 77,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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United States antitrust laws. In the Interamerican Refining76 case plaintiff
Interameri~n was an American corporation engaged in the business of
processing Venezuelan crude oil at its bonded refinery in New Jersey.
Defendants Texaco Maracaibo, Inc. and Monsanto Venezuela, Inc. held
concessions from the Venezuelan government for the production of crude oil.
They supplied crude oil to defendant Amoco Trading Company, an American
company which had contracted to supply crude oil to Interamerican. Texaco
and Monsanto were instructed not to ship crude oil to Interamerican by the
Venezuelan Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, which regulates oil
concessionaires. The reasons behind this order were apparently, first, hostility
between high Venezuelan government officials and the two principal
stockholders of Interamerican who were Venezuelan nationals and were
personae non grataeto the Venezuelan government. Secondly, the Venezuelan
government wanted to prevent the re-export of its crude oil to "unnatural"
markets such as Canada and Europe. When Texaco and Monsanto refused to
sell to Amoco for resale to Interamerican, Interamerican sued all three
companies for treble damages alleging an illegal boycott. The Court granted
defendants' motions for summary judgment because the boycott was compelled
by the Venezuelan authorities and "such compulsion is a complete defense to an
action under the antitrust laws based on that boycott."" In rejecting plaintiff's
contention that compulsion would be a valid defense only if the acts of
compulsion were valid under Venezuelan law the court relied on the Act of State
doctrine.
The Act of State doctrine, based upon proper concepts of sovereignty and separation of
powers, commands that conduct of foreign policy reside exclusively in the executive. For
our courts to look behind the acts of a foreign government would impinge upon and
perhaps impede the executive in that function. Whether or not Venezuelan officials
acted within their authority and by legitimate procedures is therefore not relevant to thr
case.

Plaintiff's attempt to limit Sabbatinoto expropriation decrees finds no support either in
the holding or the rationale of that case. The principal decision relied on in Sabbatino
dealt with a tort claim for refusal to grant a passport, unjustified confinement, assault,
and abuse ....
Other cases have applied it to lesser government acts .... The reasons of
policy which support the doctrine would hardly be served by limiting it to acts of
expropriation."
The second recent antitrust case relying on the Act of State doctrine is
Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Buttes Gas-Oil Company.79 Occidental

76

nteramerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp ,291

(D.Del.

1970), appeal withdrawn, (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1970).

"1307 F. Supp. at 1296.
"Id. at 1299 (citations omitted).
'1331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.)., cert. denied 409

U.S. 950 (1972).
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brought a treble damage action under the Sherman Act alleging that
defendants Buttes and Clayco "induced and procured" the rulers of Sharjah
and, later, Iran to claim as part of their territorial waters area covered by an oil
concession previously granted to Occidental by another adjacent sheikdom. The
court found sufficient anti-competitive impact on United States imports,
because of the intended importation of oil to be produced by Occidental from
the concession, to support jurisdiction. However, the court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss because of the applicability of the Act of State doctrine.
The plaintiff contended that it was not complaining about the acts of foreign
states, but only about the defendants' conduct in "catalyzing" those acts. The
court rejected this contention because the plaintiffs pleadings referred to the
states involved as "co-conspirators" and because the plaintiff's antitrust claim
required proof of damage resulting from forbidden conduct.
Plaintiffs necessarily ask this court to "sit in judgment" upon the sovereign acts
pleaded, whether or not the countries involved are considered co-conspirators. That is,
to establish their claim as pleaded plaintiffs must prove, inter alia, that Sharjah issued a
fraudulent territorial waters decree, and that Iran laid claim to the island of Abu Musa
at the behest of the defendants. Plaintiffs say they stand ready to prove the former
allegation by use of "internal documents." But such inquiries by this court into the
authenticity and motivation of the acts of foreign sovereigns would be the very sources of
diplomatic friction and complication that the Act of State doctrine aims to avert."
It might be argued that the Act of State and sovereign compulsion defenses
should not be available when the defendant who seeks to invoke such defense is
a nation state operating in a purely commercial capacity. It could also be
contended that the Act of State defense is available for conduct performed solely
inside the foreign state's territory.
It is true that a line of cases has developed in the expropriation area holding
that if property sought to be confiscated by a foreign state is within the United
States at the time of the attempted confiscation the Act of State doctrine will
apply only if the confiscation is consistent with United States law and policy."1
However, these cases are based upon the principle that the Act of State doctrine
applies only to acts of a foreign sovereign done within its own territory and does
not apply to actions taken outside the foreign state's territory. This type of
extraterritorial action is to be distinguished from situations involving the
extraterritorial effect of an internal act of state.

80331

F. Supp. at 110.

"See, e.g., Maltina Corp. v. CAWY Bottling Corp., 462 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir.) cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
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For example, in the InteramericanRefining case the court stated that:
It requires no precedent, however, to acknowledge that sovereignty includes the right to
regulate commerce within the nation. When a nation compels a trade practice, firms
there have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the
sovereign. The Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on United States courts over
acts of foreign sovereigns. 2 By its terms, it forbids only anticompetitive practices of
persons and corporations."
Two other lower court decisions have also recognized that an Act of State may
have an effect outside the territory of the state and that extraterritorial effect
83
does not preclude treatment of the act as an Act of State.
Moreover, our research has revealed no case in which a court refused to apply
the Act of State doctrine because the "act" was "commercial" rather than
"governmental" as defined in the previously discussed sovereign immunity
cases.84
Consequently, we conclude that whether the Arabs' actions in imposing a
destination embargo, production cutbacks and increases in the posted price of
oil.would be considered to be Acts of State is an open question that is not
answerable on the basis of existing precedents. The Interamerican Refining
case appears to be the closest case in point and under the above quoted
reasoning of that decision it is probable that the Arabs' conduct would be
considered as Acts of State because it involved regulation of commerce within
the particular Arab nations and that conduct had an extraterritorial effect.
Moreover, Parkerv. Brown 5 and its progeny, which immunize "state action"
from liability under the Sherman Act,86 lend at least some support by way of
analogy to anti-competitive actions taken by foreign state governments.
However, it should be noted that the strong public policy within the United
States in favor of competition and opposed to anti-competitive behavior might
lead a United States court to adopt the "commercial-governmental" distinction
utilized in immunity cases and to refuse to give "commercial" Acts of State
deference.
In summary, the vast majority of Act of State cases involve expropriations and
are easily distinguishable from the Arab oil activities. Moreover, the few Act of

"1307 F. Supp. at 1298.
3
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Naamloze
Vennootschap Suikerfabriek "Wono-Aseh" v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 111 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
"Accord, Victor, Multinational Corporations;Antitrust Extraterritorialityand the Prospect of
Immunity, 8 J. INT'L L. & Eco. 11, 19 (1973).
5317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
"See, e.g., New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc. 501 F2d 363, 372 (9th Cir. 1974). For
background see, Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v.
Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328 (1975); Note, Parkerv. Brown: A PreemptionAnalysis, 84 YALE L.
J. 1164 (1975).
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State and "state action" decisions rendered to date in antitrust cases offer little
guidance as to the applicability of the Act of State doctrine to the conduct of the
Arab oil producing countries. Therefore, we believe that the outcome of a
motion to dismiss based upon the Act of State doctrine in any case brought
against the Arab countries under the United States antitrust laws would be
difficult to predict and would essentially be a case of first impression.
C. Sovereign Compulsion
Sovereign compulsion, as noted earlier in this article is an affirmative defense
available to a private party and not to the state compelling the action. 7
Consequently, it is a subject beyond the scope of this article which is intended to
deal with the liabilities and defenses available to states that engage in cartel-like
activity.
D. EnforcementJurisdiction
In a recent interview the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice indicated that the Division is not now
considering antitrust suits against the OPEC countries:
We're seeing what are pretty clearly government acts, and I suppose it is conceivable
to string out some kind of theory in which you could try to work your way around the
notion of immunity, if that's the appropriate word, arising from the fact this is their
sovereign jurisdiction. But I find myself a little hung up on the question of relief. I
seriously doubt that issuing an injunction would do very much."
This statement illustrates a pragmatic problem involving nation state cartels.
Even assuming personal jurisdiction is properly obtained, the defenses of
sovereign immunity and Act of State are rejected, and the foreign state is found
to have violated the United States antitrust laws, the question of obtaining
effective relief presents serious problems.
Under present United States law the assets of foreign states, located in the
United States, absent waiver or consent by the sovereign, are immune from
execution to satisfy a judgment, even if the assets have been attached for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.8 9 In fact the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General have stated that "the immunity of a foreign state from

"TSee Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970);
Victor, supra, note 84; Note, Development of the Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MIcH. L.
REv. 889 (1971); Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States
Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INrL L. 100 (1%7).
"Interview with Thomas E. Kauper, BNA, ANTIT. & TRADE RE. REP. No. 705, at AA-3 (Mar.
18, 1975).
"See, e.g., Bradford v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Dexter and
Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyselsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930); 6 M. WHrrEmAN, supra note 57,

at 709-26.
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execution has remained absolute." 9 Thus, if single or treble damages were
awarded in an antitrust case against the Arab states for their oil related conduct
those damages would only be paid if the Arab states chose to pay them
voluntarily.
In a few cases state courts have executed judgments against the property of
foreign states. However, the unique circumstances of these cases limit their
holdings to the particular facts of each case.
In United States v. Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. 91 the sovereign's plea of
immunity was rejected as untimely filed because it was not filed until the
attached assets had been sold and had passed beyond the court's jurisdiction.
Stephen v. Zivnostenska9' involved the distribution of the assets of a bank that
had been nationalized by the Republic of Czechoslovakia. The Court held that
the bank and the Republic were separate legal entities and that "the suggestion
of immunity herein does not purport to recognize the right of immunity on the
part of the defendant [bank] or in respect of its property." 93 The third case,
NationalCityBank ofNew York v. Republic of China9" is also inapposite. In that
case China sued in a United States court to recover its bank deposits held by the
defendant bank. The defendant filed an offset counterclaim for defaulted
treasury notes issued by China. The Supreme Court held that the counterclaim
did not have to be dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity because the
State Department had made no suggestion of immunity as to the counterclaim
and because China had freely submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the United
States Court.
In short, none of these cases changes the previously stated rule that the assets
of foreign states, located in the United States, are immune from execution to
satisfy a judgment. Moreover, as Mr. Kauper points out in the interview quoted
previously in this article, 95 the issuance of an injunction prohibiting acts
violative of the United States antitrust laws by the Arab states might have no
impact on the conduct of those states because the legality of such orders is
subject to considerable international dispute 96 and because of the lack of United
States sanctions if the order is violated.

"Letter from Richard G. Kleindienst and William P. Rogers to the President of the Senate, 119
CONG. REC. S. 1299, at S. 1300 (Daily ed. Jan. 26, 1973). Section 1610 of S. 566 provided that

"property held for commercial purposes should be available for satisfaction of judgments rendered
in connection with commercial activities." Hearings, supra, note 50, at 45.
"149 So. 2d 384 (Fla. App. 1963).
92222 N.Y.S. 2d 128, 15 App. Div. 111 (1961).
"1222 N.Y.S.2d, at 136.
9"348 U.S. 356 (1955).
"See text at n. 88, supra.
"See, e.R., Committee on the Extraterritorial Application of Restrictive Trade Leeislation,

Report. in

REPORT OF THE

SIST CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 565

(1965); Jennings, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionand the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B.
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To sum up: we believe that effective remedial action against the Arabs' oil
conduct would have to be achieved through increased international cooperation
in antitrust matters 97 and through diplomatic negotiations because of the
probable ineffectiveness of an order issued by a United States court.
V.

Public International Law

The Arab states and their spokesmen have offered several justifications under
public international law for the destination oil embargo. The imposition of
production cutbacks and increases in the posted price of oil have been justified
primarily on the basis of the right of sovereign states to control their natural
resources. An exhaustive examination of these various contentions and the
relevant rebuttal arguments is beyond the scope of this article. For our purposes
it is sufficient to note that the various contradictory contentions are evidence
that the status of the Arabs' activities under public international law is unsettled
and may not presently fall within any of the recognized categories of illegal
international conduct.
A. The Embargo
1. A LEGAL TACTIC IN TIME OF WAR?
The Arabs contend that the embargo was imposed by states who were actually
engaged in a war with Israel and that the embargo had the political purpose of
achieving the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories and the
restoration of the. legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. They note that the
United States has often used embargoes to achieve political objectives and that
international law clearly recognizes "the right of a belligerent state to resort to
measures of economic warfare against its adversary and to apply economic
sanctions against third states which violate their obligations of neutrality in this
regard.""8
In response to this contention that the embargo constituted a legal tactic of
economic warfare because of the illegality of Israeli occupation of Arab territory
and the failure of the Arabs to obtain redress by peaceful methods, Eugene
Rostow has argued that the contention is invalid because it rests on an
erroneous interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 which permitted
Israel to remain on the cease-fire lines of 1967 as the occupying power until the
parties to the war reach an agreement. Because Israel was legally occupying

INT'L L. 146 (1957); Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law,
ill7 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, (1964).
See, Kintner, Joelson & Vaghi, GropingforaTruly InternationalAntitrust Law, 14 VA. J. INr'L

L. 75 (1973).
"Shihata, supra, note 11, at 614.
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captured Arab territory the Arabs were not legally justified in attacking Israel to
regain the occupied territory. Therefore the imposition of an embargo in pursuit
of that objective was not legally justified.99
2., A VIOLATION OF THE GATT?
The Arabs also contend that, although two of the Arab states 00 are
contracting parties to the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT)"
which contains a general prohibition on the use of export and import controls 1°2
and a requirement that imports and exports are to be administered without
discrimination against "all third countries," 013 the GATT has not been violated
by their oil actions. This contention is based upon Article XX of GATT, which
permits deviation from these general prohibitions "relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption"; and
upon Article xXI which declares that nothing in the GATT shall be construed
"to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests... taken in time of
war or other emergency in international relations ... "104
The Arabs' reliance on these exceptions to the GATT rules appears to be
more persuasive than their contention that the embargo was legitimate in
wartime, but the issue is not free from doubt. One of the leading authorities on
the GATT has characterized the exceptions contained in Articles XX and XXI
as a "dangerous loophole to the obligations of GATT" 1I 5 and another authority
has noted that all of the principles of the GATT "are effectively vitiated by a
subsequent GATT article (XXI). . . ." 101Nevertheless, it has been argued that:
(1)Arab reliance on this exception in the GATT [Art. XXI] must fail in view of the actual
context and relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter, which must be utilized as a guide to
rational, policy-serving interpretation. (2) The Arab oil cuts must be condemned as
"arbitrary" in the sense of the purposes of the GATT and in light of the unilateral
character of the Arab decisions. (3) The oil cuts are also "unjustifiable" (even if not

arbitrary) in that a joint Arab committee decided upon them in terms of the pro-Arab or
anti-Arab posture of other states. (4) The oil cuts are additionally "unjustifiable" in

"Rostow, the Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 6, 1973, 69 AM. J. INT'L. 272
(1975).
'0°Egypt and Kuwait. Algeria, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have accepted
GATT's de facto application to them. Dept. of State, Treaties in Force on Jan. 1, 1975, at 348.
'O'Signed at Geneva on Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700; 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
'0 11d. Art. XI. There are a number of exceptions to these prohibitions. See Arts. XI & XII.
'°3Id. Art. XIII(I).
"'4 Shihata, supra note 11, at 621-23.
'1J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 748 (1969). See, G. BERGSTEN, COMPLETING THE GATTr: TOWARD NEW INTERNATIONAL RULES TO GovERN EXPORT CONTROLS (1974).
"'Statement of Prof. Richard N. Gardner, supra note 60, at 157.
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terms of serving the relevant goals of the international community as contained in the
U.N. Charter. 107
It should be noted that there is no intergovernmental commodity agreement for
oil as there is for other commodities, and that traditional commodity agreements,
i.e., multilateral agreements that provide for special arrangements beyond
normal market mechanisms, can be distinguished from producer cartels. In the
former, producer and consumer governments agree-often on the basis of
political rather than business considerations-to manage the supply and price
of a particular commodity for their mutual advantage. On the other hand, a
producer cartel is an agreement among members of one side of the
producer-consumer population to fix prices or control production for its own
advantage regardless of the effect on consumers. 101
3. A VIOLATION OF UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS?
The final contention made by the Arabs in defense of their oil embargo is that
it was not in violation of either Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter which provides
that
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,
or of the United Nations General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States which includes the following statement:
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the
exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. 109
The Arabs reason that neither of these provisions prohibits the use of economic
measures in cases involving self-defense or reprisals against states responsible,
directly or indirectly, for the deprivation of legal rights (in this case the rights of
the Palestinians), but this position is by no means beyond controversy. It has also
been suggested that the oil embargo is difficult to classify as a use of "force"
against the "territorial integrity or independence" of states and is therefore not in

'07Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to InternationalPeace, 68 AM. J. INT'L
LAW. 410, 424 (1974). The authors of this article apparently used the work "cuts" to include both
production cutbacks and "cut" in shipments of oil.
'O°See, C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND "1VESTMENT
496-536 (1970); 2 S. Metzger, Law of International Trade 1166-1377 (1966); Symposium,
Commodity Agreements, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 271 (1963).
International
0

. '° U.N.G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Oct. 24, 1970; 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 122-24, U.N. Doc.
A/8082 (1970); 9 Int'l Legal Mats. 1292, 1295 (1970).
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violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.

10

Moreover, recent

attempts by UN committees to define "aggression" have intentionally omitted
any reference to economic coercion."'
In reply to these assertions critics of the Arabs' position argue that engaging in
a concerted plan of "economic warfare" to achieve political ends is inconsistent
with the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly Articles 1 and 2
which provide that members of the United Nations have agreed to settle
international problems by peaceful means and to refrain from the use of force and
coercion. 2 They contend that the use of economic coercion by a member of the

The origin of this Declaration is Article 3 of Resolution 290 (IV) of the General Assembly,
December 1, 1949 [GAOR, IV, Resolution (A/1251), p. 13] and is a word-for-word repetition of
Article 2 of the 1965 Declaration on Inadmissability of Intervention, Resolution 2131 (XX) of the
General Assembly, December 21, 1965 [GAOR, XX, Supp. 14 (A/6014), pp. 11-12]. An early
example of an unsuccessful attempt to promote a definition of "economic aggression" in the U.N.
may be found in Soviet Union, Draft Resolution, October 18, 1954, A/C. 6/L. 332/Rev. 1 [GAOR,
Annexes (IX) 51, pp. 6-7]. For general discussions, see, Boorman, Economic Coercion in
InternationalLaw:theArab Oil Weapon and the EnsuingJuridicalIssues, 9 J. INV'sL L. & Eco. 295
(1974). Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in the Legality Under Article 2(4) of
the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1974).
"'Letter from Stephen Smith to Editor in Chief, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 136 (1975). But see, Paust &
Blaustein, Response to Letter from Stephen Smith, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 637 (1975).
'On December 14, 1974 the U.N. General Assembly approved the following definition of
aggression, which was drafted by the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression.
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance
with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any
military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use
of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, marine and air fleets
of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State, which are within the territory of another State with the
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the
agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another
State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third
State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
Art. 3 o Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, Dec. 14, 1974, Resol. 3314 (XXIX) p.
142, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31 (A/9631).
For background see, Report of the Working Group of the U.N. Special Committee on Defining
Aggression, 13 Int'l Legal Mats. 710 (1974); Ferencz, Defining Aggression-The Last Mile, 12
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 430 (1973). Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It's
Going, 66 Am J. Int'l L. 491 (1972). With respect to the position of the Soviet Union, see U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 134/L. 12 (1969). For the positions of the western powers, see U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/L. 17
(1969). For the positions of the non-committed powers, see U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/L. 16 (1969).
"'See, e.g., -Paust & Blaustein, supra note 110, at 107; Letter from Prof. Julius Stone,
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United Nations is only permissible when it is done pursuant to a resolution of the
Security Council authorizing economic sanctions.113 Moreover, such United

Nations actions have been limited to embargoes to prevent arms and other war
material from reaching the hands of belligerents or potential aggressors. The
resolutions directed at South Africa,' 1, Rhodesia, 11 and Portugal 1 6 have been of
this limited nature.
Consequently, these critics contend that because the embargo was not
imposed pursuant to an appropriate Security Council or General Assembly
resolution it constitutes a violation of the United Nations Charter.
In sum, the legal status of the type of embargo imposed by the Arabs is the
subject of disputed contentions. There appears to be a paucity of "authorities"
or "rules" directly on point; and the highly political nature of the dispute makes
it unlikely that a majority of countries will be able to agree on a legal resolution
of the disputed contentions.

B. Production Cutbacks and Price Increases
1. PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES
the Arabs have attempted to justify their oil production cutbacks and
increases in posted prices by reliance on the resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly on "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources" 'II which

Washington Post, Dec. 8, 1973, §A, at 19, cols. 2-5; Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by
States, 13 VA. J. IN'L L. 1 (1972); Lee& McCobb, supra note 62, at 17-21. For background see, J.
STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1958); D. Bowsrr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1958).
11
'The United Nations Charter, art. 41, reads:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
i"G.A. Res. 2505B (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630, at 24-25 (1969), calls
upon "all states to implement fully and scrupulously all provisions of the Security Council
resolutions concerning the embargo on the supplying of arms and other military equipment to the
Government of South Africa."
"325 U.N.SCOR, 1,535th meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/277 (1970).
"'See U.N. Doc. S/10030 (1970) containing the draft resolution sponsored by Burundi, Nepal,
Sierra Leone, Syria and Zambia, urging "all states to refrain from providing the Government of
Portugal with military and material assistance enabling it to continue its repressive actions against
the peoples of the Territories under its domination and against independent African States." The
resolution was adopted on Dec. 8, 1970 U.N. Doc. S/PV.1563, at 72 (1970).
"'U.N. G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), GAOR, 28th Sess., Dec. 17, 1973 (vote: 108-1-16); 13 Iwr'L
LEGAL MATS. 238 (1974). See, e.g., Solemn Declaration of the Sovereigns and Heads of State of the
OPEC, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 566 (1975); El Azhary, Letter to the Editor: Defending the Interests
of the OPEC Nations, Washington Post, July 25, 1975, §A, at 25, col. 4.
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provides that each state has the inalienable right to exercise sovereignty over its
natural resources covering all stages of utilization of those resources "from
exploration to marketing." The resolution also states:
one of the most effective ways in which the developing countries can protect their natural
resources is to establish, promote or strengthen machinery for co-operation among them
which has its main purposes to concert pricing policies, to improve conditions of access
to markets, to coordinate production policies and, thus, to guarantee the full exercise of
sovereignty by developing countries over their natural resources. " ,
The Arabs point out that this resolution was passed two months after their
production cutbacks and price increases and that on the same day this resolution
was adopted the General Assembly adopted another resolution affirming "the
right of the Arab States and Peoples whose territories are under foreign
occupation to permanent sovereignty over all their natural resources."' 19
Moreover, they contend that the previously quoted prohibition of economic
coercion contained in the United Nations' Friendly Relations Declaration is
limited to the use of economic measures to achieve illegitimate purposes. 120
In response to these contentions it has been noted that other United Nations
documents' 2 ' and the United Nations Charter itself make it clear that in a world
of natural resource interdependence the exercise of sovereignty over natural
resources must be balanced with the need for international economic
cooperation. Thus, natural resources cannot be legally used to coerce or to punish
other states unless the use of such coercion is approved by the Security Council or
the General Assembly pursuant to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter.
In addition the resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
does not permit states to breach existing concession contracts or bilateral treaties
between producing and consuming countries. Therefore, actions taken in breach
of these agreements would be violations of the state's obligation to bargain in
22
good faith and adhere to its commitments.
CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF STATES
Although articles published to date defending the Arabs' oil actions have not
cited it, the United Nations General Assembly's Charter of Economic Rights and
2.

"Id. at 7.
"'U.N. G.A. Res. 3175 (XXVIII), GAOR, 28th Sess., Dec. 17, 1973.
"'Shihata, supra note 11, at 618-19. See F. RouHmAr, supra note 2, at 141-42; for background
see. M. MUGHRABY, supra note 5.
"'See, e.g., U.N. G.A. Res. 3172 (VIII), GAOR 28th Sess., Dec. 17, 1973 (noting urgent need
for international cooperation); U.N. Doc. A/PV 2207, Apr. 9, 1974 (Address by Secretary-General
Waldheim).
"'See Remarks of G.W. Haight in Panel Discussions: Foreign Governmental Control of
MultinationalCorporationsMarketing in the United States, 2 SYRAcusE J. INr'L L. & COMM. 211
(1974).
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Duties of States' 23 contains a series of provisions apparently justifying primary
commodity cartels. I While the Charter was adopted in December 1974, i.e.,
after the Arabs' oil embargo and price increases of 1973-74, it is a non-binding
document'25 which was opposed by several major powers and is at best merely a
set of recommendations endorsed by a number of less developed countries.
Contentions that the Arabs' conduct is outside the scope of accepted
principles of international treaty law barring restrictive trade practices must
confront the fact that the Arab states are not parties to those treaties. 126
Moreover, although those treaties may constitute some evidence of an evolving
international standard as to the desirability of prohibiting certain practices, the
treaties themselves as well as the state practice are not consistent in their
treatment of particular business practices. I 7 Furthermore, it is beyond dispute
that no widespread international consensus has been reached as to which
practices, if any, should be banned on an international basis. This is the case
with respect to private restrictive conduct and hence is a fortiori the situation
where the restrictive practices of nation states themselves are concerned.
Similarly, the various attempts to achieve international antitrust cooperation
have not involved the Arab states and in fact have met with only limited
success. 2 8 Consequently, they offer little in the way of established standards
which could be used to evaluate the legality of the Arabs' conduct.

...
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 31 (A/9631), at 50; 14 IN'L L.
MATS. 251 (1975). See, Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, A
Rejection of InternationalLaw, 9 INT'L LAWYER 295 (1975).

2
'See Brower & Tepe, supra note 123, at 314-16.
'"Charter Preamble; see Brower & Tepe, supra note 123, at 300-02.
" 6See, e.g., Treaties Establishing the European Communities, Done, March 25, 1957, eff. Jan. 1,
1958, arts. 85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,47-49, 1 CCH, Comm. Mkt. Rep. 2005-2111 (1973) (English
transl; an additional English translation may be found in 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 865 (1957); Convention
Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty of
Montevideo (forming L.A.F.T.A.), signed 2/18/60, U.N. Doc. E/CN. /2-62 (UNMEC); the
agreement establishing COMECON, 368 U.N.T.S. 253 (done Dec. 14, 1959, eff. April 13, 1960);
Treaty establishing the Central American Common Market, Mercado Comun Centroamericano,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/CCE/67 (English ed.).

For articles discussing these treaties see Schill, The Mexican and Andian Investment Codes: An

Overview and Comparison, 6 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 437, 437-40, 448, 460-63 (1974); Symposium
on East-West Trade (Pts. I & I1), 37 LAW& CONTEMP. Paoa. 393, 533 (1972); Comment, Regional
Economic Integration and GA TT: The Effects of the EEC-EFTA Agreements on International
Trade, 6 LAW& PoL. INT'L Bus. 202 (1974); Note, Article 85 and EuropeanAntitrust Litigation:A
Search for Economic Balancing, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1275 (1975).
"See, e.g., H. KRONSTEIN, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1973); COMMON MARKET
AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CONFLICT (J. Rahl ed. 1970); Griffin, The Power of
Host Countries Over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil in the European Economic Community and
the United States, 6 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 375 (1974); De Richemont, The Regulation of Resale
PriceMaintenanceUnder U.S., French, German, British andEEC Law: A ComparativeAnalysis, 5
LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 440 (1973); Schwartz & Wellman, The Rule ofReason in EEC Antitrust, 12
VA. J. INT'L L. 2 (1972).
"'See Davidow, The U.S. and International Antitrust Cooperation (Speech before the World
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In summary, these various contentions lead to the conclusion that, as in the
case of the embargo, the legality of the production cutbacks and the price
increases under international law is overcast with considerable dispute and is
not likely to be resolved by timely international resolution of the disputed
contentions.
VI.

Conclusion

As we noted at the outset of this article, we believe that the legal status of a
restrictive practice engaged in by nation state cartels is best appraised on a case
by case basis after a thorough examination of the specific factual setting of the
cartel. Our examination of the OPEC cartel and existing precedents under
United States antitrust law reveals, we believe, that the OPEC nations may well
be entitled to the defenses of sovereign immunity and application of the Act of
State doctrine for their 1973-74 oil activities. This is not to say that these nations
cannot be sued and that new case law could not be forged thereby. Such
overriding of the available defenses would, however, have to be based upon an
extension of existing precedents or upon new legislative authority.
The status of the OPEC cartel under public international law is hotly
disputed. We have not attempted an exhaustive analysis of the merits of the
various contentions. Rather have we sought merely to outline the bases of the
dispute in order to demonstrate the extent of the disagreement which surrounds
the legal status of the Arabs' oil activities. There still remains the task of
resolving the disputed contentions on the basis of further detailed research and
scholarship.
We believe that in our world of economic interdependence the exercise of
sovereignty over natural resources, even where prompted by the legitimate
desire to protect such resources, must be tempered by a due regard forthe
impact of sovereign action on consuming countries and on the peoples of the
world as a whole.
It seems to us that the best answer to these problems--difficult and remote as
its achievement sometimes seems-is the establishment of international rules
and mechanisms, applicable to nation state cartel practices. These rules and
mechanisms, whether formal or informal, must be designed to prevent
combinations of sovereign nations from using their natural endowments for
purposes other than the legitimate utilization and protection of these resources.

Trade Institute Jan. 29, 1975); Kintner, Joelson & Vaghi supra note 97; Zisler, The Work of the
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 289 (1974).
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